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Abstract The identity of a user is permanently lost if biometric data gets
compromised since the biometric information is irreplaceable and irrevocable.
To revoke and reissue a new template in place of the compromised biometric
template, the idea of cancelable biometrics has been introduced. The concept
behind cancelable biometric is to irreversibly transform the original biomet-
ric template and perform the comparison in the protected domain. In this
paper, a coprime transformation scheme has been proposed to derive a pro-
tected fingerprint template. The method divides the fingerprint region into
a number of sectors with respect to each minutiae point and identifies the
nearest-neighbor minutiae in each sector. Then, ridge features for all neigh-
boring minutiae points are computed and mapped onto co-prime positions of
a random matrix to generate the cancelable template. The proposed approach
achieves an EER of 1.82, 1.39, 4.02 and 5.77 on DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4
datasets of the FVC2002 and an EER of 8.70, 7.95, 5.23 and 4.87 on DB1,
DB2, DB3 and DB4 datasets of FVC2004 databases, respectively. Experimen-
tal evaluations indicate that the method outperforms in comparison to the
current state-of-the-art. Moreover, it has been confirmed from the security
analysis that the proposed method fulfills the desired characteristics of diver-
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sity, revocability, and non-invertibility with a minor performance degradation
caused by the transformation.
Keywords Biometric · Cancelable biometrics · Fingerprint verification ·
Template protection
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Compromise of original biometric information causes permanent identity theft
as it is intrinsically linked to the user. In thee literature, there are various secu-
rity concerns associated with the usage of biometric information across differ-
ent applications [1,2]. Ratha et al. [1] first proposed three cancelable transfor-
mations namely cartesian, polar and functional transformations. Shin et al. [3]
applied dictionary attack onto these transformations to derive a pre-image and
found that the transformation is vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, biometric
template protection is the utmost need in recent years. There are two well-
known mechanisms to provide template protection i.e. Biometric cryptosystem
and Cancelable biometrics. The biometric cryptosystem reforms the original
template and generates poor matching rate. Hence, many researchers utilized
cancelable biometric-based transformations to provide template protection. It
states that a transformed template is required to be stored instead of the orig-
inal biometric template. The transformation depends upon an irreversible or
non-invertible function such that it is infeasible to invent the original biomet-
ric template even if the attacker gets access to the protected template and
transformation key. In case of compromise, a new template can be derived by
modifying the transformation key used for protected template generation. The
cancelable transformation must follow the four desired characteristics:
1. Non-invertibility: It should be computationally hard enough to construct
the original template from the transformed template. This prevents the
recovery of original biometric information by an imposter.
2. Diversity: Identical cancelable template should not be used in the different
applications to avoid cross-matching of the stored template.
3. Revocability: The transformation should be able to derive numerous pro-
tected templates from the same biometric input and there should be im-
mediate revocation in case of compromise.
4. Performance: The transformation should not exhibit significant perfor-
mance degradation.
1.2 Existing approaches
In literature, authors have proposed several methods for cancelable template
generation in recent years. Ratha et al. [1] have introduced cartesian, polar,
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and functional transformation for fingerprint template protection. Das et al.
[4] evaluated nearest neighbor distance from minutiae points to the core point.
Next, they constructed a graph structure which can be revoked using a PIN.
However, the approaches introduced by Ratha [1] and Das [4] et al. require pre-
alignment of different fingerprints based on singular/core point and detection
of the core point is not always feasible.
Lee et al. [5] introduced a technique which pre-aligns minutiae points and
maps into a 3-D array based on the minutia’s orientation and positional differ-
ence. Next, the array is visited in sequential order to generate a bit string. The
derived bit string is exploited to random permutation based on a user-specific
key and minutiae type. An alignment-free protected template design method is
proposed by Wang et al. [6] where pair-minutiae vectors are quantized, indexed
and converted to bit-string. Then, discrete Fourier transform (DFT) is applied
to generate a complex vector which is further fused with a user-specific key. In
their another work, Wang et al. [7] proposed a method to protect the bit-string
derived using the method proposed in [6]. The bit-string is utilized as an input
to FIR filter with a user-specific key. Moujahdi et al. [8] presented a unique
transformation i.e. fingerprint shell where they computed the distance from
the singular point to all other minutiae. Next, a user-specific key is summed
up to the computed distances and are sorted in ascending order to generate a
spiral curve structure. Jin et al. [9] introduced a method where minutiae triplet
features are computed, i.e. three sides, three internal angle and relative ori-
entation. Further, a random sequence is projected onto features to derive the
protected template. Jin et al. [10] proposed a protected fingerprint template
generation scheme where minutiae information is first aligned and shifted to
a new position. Next, the polar transform is utilized, and bit-string is derived
by applying quantization. Further, the random permutation is exploited to
generate the protected template. The approaches proposed in [8,5,6,7,10,9]
results to performance degradation if the user-specific key gets compromised.
Further, Wang et al. [11] presented a method where a bit string is derived by
utilizing partial Hadamard transform. In BioHashing based approaches [12,
13,14], a protected template is derived after discretizing the inner product of
the biometric features with the projection matrix. BioHashing and its variants
[12,13,14], are proved to be impractical if the unique seed is compromised.
Sandhya et al. [15] proposed two different algorithms to design cancelable fin-
gerprint template where Delaunay triangle based features are incorporated.
However, the performance gets degraded in case of poor quality images. Abe
et al. [16] proposed a method on template generation where bloom filter is
applied onto bit-string derived by minutiae relation code. The scheme is sus-
ceptible to inversion attack if parameters of bloom filter get compromised.
Cappelli et al. [17] proposed a state-of-the-art minutiae representation
MCC (Minutiae cylinder Code) where a 3-D cylindrical structure is framed
in the vicinity of each minutiae neighborhood. Thereafter, Ferrara et al. [18]
introduced a method namely protected-MCC (P-MCC) where they applied
binary-KL projection for each MCC templates to alleviate privacy issues over
non-invertibility in MCC [17]. However, it has been further investigated that
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the P-MCC approach is irrevocable to some extent. To provide revocabil-
ity, Ferrara et al. [19] presented two-factor protected Minutiae Cylinder-Code
(2P-MCC) where partial permutation is performed using a secret key over the
cylinders in P-MCC. Recently, Rathgeb et al. [20] proposed a theoretical esti-
mation of the irreversibility of the generic protected biometric templates. They
evaluated the complexity of inverting the protected template by quantifying
the security provided by the different approaches. Thereafter, a novel general
framework for the evaluation of unlinkability among biometric templates is
proposed by Gomez-Barrero et al. [21]. Also, a protocol is defined to analyze
the correlation between different templates of same and different subjects.
1.3 Contributions
To mitigate the different concerns raised by afore-stated approaches, we have
proposed a novel protected template generation scheme for fingerprint bio-
metric which is based on coprime mapping transformation. We highlight the
contributions of this work as follows:
1. In this work, coprime mapping transformation has been applied over ridge
features which deal with rotation, scale and translation distortions in the
input fingerprint image effectively.
2. The applied transformation does not depend on prior alignment based on
the singular/core points as it is not always possible to extract the singu-
larities in poor quality images.
3. The nearest neighbor transformation is applied in the vicinity of each minu-
tia to compute a fixed length descriptor instead of fixed-radius transfor-
mation. This would prevent performance degradation caused due to the
border minutiae points.
4. We have evaluated our method against the desirable characteristics of tem-
plate security schemes, i.e. non-invertibility, revocability, and diversity.
5. The recognition performance of the proposed approach is tested on two
different benchmark databases i.e. FVC2002 and FVC2004. The experi-
mental evaluations indicate that our method outperforms in comparison
to the current state-of-the-art.
This article is an extension of our earlier work [22]. In the previous work,
we proposed a technique for generation of cancelable fingerprint template.
However, the previous work does not include a rigorous experimental analysis
concerning accuracy and attack analysis. Furthermore, the earlier method was
tested with only FVC2002 database [23]. In this work, experiments have been
performed onto all four datasets i.e.DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4 of FVC2004
database. Further, experimental results are also compared with existing meth-
ods to determine the robustness of the proposed method. Additionally, we
have performed a rigorous security analysis against different possible attacks
such as brute-force, pre-image and annealing attack in this work. Finally, we
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Fig. 1 Block diagram of the proposed method
have enhanced our literature review by adding few relevant existing approaches
describing current advancement in the area.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
proposed protected template generation method in detail. Experiments and
comparisons are demonstrated in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the security
and privacy of the transformation. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Proposed scheme
The proposed method comprises of three major steps which include the prepro-
cessing and minutiae extraction, feature extraction, and cancelable template
generation. The overall workflow of the proposed method is depicted in Fig.
1.
2.1 Pre-processing and minutiae extraction
In our method, pre-processing and minutiae point extraction is carried out
using the scheme described in [24]. Here, the minutiae points are denoted as:
Vup = {mi}ni=1
mi = (xi, yi, θi) (1)
where, Vup represents the set of raw minutiae points extracted from an in-
put fingerprint, ith minutiae point is denoted by mi out of total n minutiae
points. (xi, yi) and θi denotes the coordinate position and orientation for the
ith minutiae point. We also obtain a thinned fingerprint image which is further
used for invaqriant feature extraction.
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2.2 Feature extraction
Invariant feature computation from a fingerprint image is an utmost need since
performance may degrade due to rotation, translation and scale uncertainties
caused at the time of acquisition. In this work, we calculate ridge features
to deal with these deformations present in the input fingerprint image. In
this work, feature extraction is carried out using two steps: nearest-neighbor
structure construction and ridge feature computation.
2.2.1 Nearest-neighbor structure construction:
Following the preprocessing and minutiae extraction, we achieve a thinned
output image and minutiae information. Afterward, we consider one of the
minutiae from the minutiae set Vup as a reference minutia. Next, a nearest-
neighbor structure is formed around the reference minutia based on the ridge
coordinate system as shown in Fig. 2(a). The ridge coordinate system assigns
the reference axis such that it coincides with the orientation of the reference
minutiae. Further, the fingerprint region is divided into ‘s’ sectors of equal
angular width utilizing ridge coordinate system as illustrated in Fig. 2(a).
Sector 1
Sector 2
Sector 3
Sector 4
Sector 5
Sector 6
Sector 7
Sector 8
m2
m1
(a) Nearest-neighbor structure for s =
8
1
1
k

2
1
k

11
r
θ1
m1
m2
(b) Ridge-based feature computation
Fig. 2 Feature extraction
2.2.2 Ridge feature computation:
We consider ridge count and average ridge orientation as an invariant feature
in this work. The ridge features are calculated between reference minutiae
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and nearest minutiae in each sector considering each minutia as the reference.
Ridge count is evaluated by counting the ridges between reference minutiae
and nearest neighbor minutia. For example, ridge count between two minutiae
points ( say m1 and m2 ) is 2 as shown in Fig. 2(b). To compute ridge orienta-
tion, the angle subtended by the tangent line and the straight line connecting
two minutiae points is measured for each ridge crossing. For example, the ori-
entation of the first ridge in the first sector as shown in Fig. 2(b), θk11 can be
evaluated as:
for sector 1: θk11 = θ
r1
1 − θ1
where θ1 is the slope of the straight line starting from reference minutiae to
neighboring minutia in the first sector. θr11 , is the angle spanned by a tangent
line from the intersection point of first ridge and reference axis. Similarly, we
compute the orientation of the second ridge, θk21 and evaluate the mean ridge
orientation for example shown in Fig. 2(b). The mean ridge orientation for
each sector can be expressed as defined in Eq. (2).
for ith sector: rori =
(
θr1i − θi
)
+
(
θr2i − θi
)
+ ........+
(
θrNrii − θi
)
Nri
(2)
where Nri denotes the total number of ridges between the nearest minutiae
and the reference minutiae in the ith sector. The ridge features are stored in a
2-D matrix (F ). For example, if a fingerprint contains n number of minutiae
points, the feature matrix F will contain n × 2s entries containing s ridge
count and s average ridge orientation if the fingerprint image is divided into s
number of sectors. A value zero is assigned to the ridge features if no minutia
point is located in that sector. At the time of matching, we do not consider
the sectors with no minutiae point.
2.3 Cancelable template generation
The generation of cancelable fingerprint template involves two steps: matrix
generation and co-prime mapping.
2.3.1 Matrix generation:
The feature matrix is mapped into a high-dimensional matrix to generate the
protected template. For this purpose, a random matrix CanTemp of size T×T
is generated using a seed (ρ). The value of T is equal to n × 2s where n and
s are the total number of minutiae points in the input fingerprint image and
the number of sectors around a reference minutiae, respectively.
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2.3.2 Co-prime mapping:
We map the feature matrix Fn×2s into CanTemp such that there will be
no overlapping. To perform this, we map the ridge features F onto coprime
positions at T places of CanTemp. Rest of the entries of the matrix are filled
with some random data. The following four keys are utilized for mapping:
1. k1 : initial row position
2. k2 : initial column position
3. k3 : number of row jump from initial position
4. k4 : number of column jump from initial position
The start position is selected on the basis of the user-specific key. We start
at position (k1, k2) in matrix CanTemp. The next position (NP ) is evaluated
based on the row and column jump from the initial position using the following
relation described in Eq. (3) and (4):
NPi =
{
k1 + k3 if (k1 + k3 6 T )
k1 + k3 − T if (k1 + k3 > T ) (3)
NPj =
{
k2 + k4 if (k2 + k4 6 T )
k2 + k4 − T if (k2 + k4 > T ) (4)
The coprime mapping avoids overlapping in the matrix. Further, we select
the value of k3 and k4 such that both should be co-prime with T as defined in
Eq. (5).
GCD (k3, T ) = 1 ∀ k3[2, T ]
GCD (k4, T ) = 1 ∀ k4[2, T ] (5)
For example, if the key values for start position are k1=2 and k2=2, re-
spectively and the key values for row and column jump are k3=3, k4=5, then
the co-prime based mapping is depicted in Fig. 3.
2.4 Matching
Fingerprint matching involves the comparison between an enrolled fingerprint
template (say CT ) and a query fingerprint template (say QT ) to output a
match score. In our method, two-step matching is performed to compute match
score: Local matching and global matching.
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Fig. 3 Example of co-prime based mapping procedure
2.4.1 Local matching:
In local matching, ridge feature set corresponding to a minutiae point from
QT is compared with ridge feature set for a minutiae point of CT to return
local match score. Mapped ridge feature set in the QT and CT are accessed
using user-specific keys k1, k2, k3 and k4. We compute the Euclidean distance
between the mapped non-zero entries of the query and enrolled template. Next,
we compute the mean of the minimum distances corresponding to each non-
zero entries of the two ridge features sets of CT and QT as described in Eq.
(6).
e dist =
√
(QTN [i][1]− CTM [j][1])2 + (QTN [i][2]− CTM [j][2])2 (6)
2.4.2 Global matching:
In global matching, we compute the number of matched minutiae points be-
tween QT and CT utilizing the local match scores by comparing each ridge-
feature set from QT with each ridge-feature set from CT . Next, overall match-
ing score is evaluated by the number of matched minutiae points divided by
the number of minutiae points in QT as described in Eq. (7).
overall match score =
match minutiae count
N
(7)
3 Experimental Results and Analysis
In our experiment, we use four datasets DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4 of FVC2002
and FVC2004 databases [23] since the most of the existing approaches utilized
these datasets. Each datasets DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4 of FVC2002 and
FVC2004 contain a total of 800 images of 100 subjects with eight samples
each. The performance of the method is evaluated with four parameters: False
Acceptance Rate (FAR), False Rejection Rate (FRR), Equal Error Rate (EER)
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which is defined as the error rate when the FRR and FAR holds equality, and
GAR is computed as 1-FRR.
3.1 Validation of parameter: Number of sectors (s)
The proposed method divides the input fingerprint image into the s number of
sectors with equal angular width after preprocessing. To validate the parameter
s, we have performed a number of experiments considering different values of
s. We have computed the EER with angular width of 15◦, 30◦, . . . and 90◦
corresponding to s = 24,12,. . . and 4, respectively. The performance for the
different values of s is reported in Table 1. From the reported results in Table
1, we observe that s =8 corresponds to the best performance on each of the
datasets of FVC2002. Also, it has also been observed that EER increases
due to more number of sectors without minutiae points for high values of s.
Therefore, we have considered s = 8 for all other experiments for each dataset
of FVC2002 and FVC2004 databases.
3.2 Performance
We have utilized FVC protocol to evaluate the performance of our method.
In this protocol, each subject is compared against the first sample of the re-
maining subjects to calculate impostor scores. Further, the genuine score is
computed by comparing each sample against the remaining samples of the
same subject. Hence, it requires 4950 and 2800 impostor and genuine compar-
isons for all four datasets of FVC2002 and FVC2004 databases respectively if
all samples are enrolled. Further, we have conducted the experiments under
two scenarios: Same key scenario and different key scenario.
3.2.1 Same key scenario:
This scenario represents the performance under the assumption that all the
users hold the same key. In this situation, an adversary utilizes the key being
a genuine user to gain unauthorized access to the system. To evaluate the
performance, we utilize same keys for all users (i.e. k1, k2, k3 and k4) for
enrollment. Next, we apply the proposed method to DB1, DB2, DB3 and
the DB4 dataset of database FVC2002 and FVC2004. Figure 4 and Figure
Table 1 EER obtained for databases FVC 2002 DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4 in same key
scenario
Number of sectors (s)
EER (in %)
FVC2002 DB1 FVC2002 DB2 FVC2002 DB3 FVC2002 DB4
4 3.93 3.79 5.86 6.83
8 1.82 1.39 4.02 5.77
16 5.04 4.93 8.83 12.7
32 9.63 5.19 11.24 19.3
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5 represent the ROC curves for each dataset of FVC2002 and FVC2004
databases for the optimal value of parameter s (i.e., s=8), respectively.
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Fig. 4 ROC curves for FVC 2002 DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4 under same key scenario
FVC2002 : For the database FVC2002, we obtain an EER of 1.82, 1.39,
4.02, and 5.77 for DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4, respectively under FVC
protocol. Out of all four datasets, the proposed scheme attains superior
performance onto DB1 and DB2 as these datasets comprise plenty of good
quality images in comparison to DB3 and DB4 datasets. Also, DB3 and DB4
datasets include poor quality images containing less number of minutiae
points per image as compared to dataset DB1 and DB2. Consequently, we
obtain high values of EER for the two datasets, i.e. DB3 and DB4.
FVC2004: We also apply the proposed method onto the FVC2004 database.
As a result, we attain an EER of 8.70, 7.95, 5.23, and 4.87 for DB1, DB2,
DB3, and DB4 datasets, respectively. We observe that the method achieves
better on DB4, out of all FVC2004 datasets due to relatively better quality
images. However, the performance gets degraded in case of DB2 since the first
two images of the DB2 dataset are densely distorted. Furthermore, the small
overlap area for the images of stored and query templates is another reason
for getting less accuracy on FVC2004 DB2. We obtain high values of EER for
all four datasets of FVC2004 in comparison to all datasets of the FVC2002
database since deliberate deformation are requested to each user at the time
of acquisition [23].
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Fig. 5 ROC curves for FVC 2004 DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4 under same key scenario
3.2.2 Different key scenario:
We also evaluate our method in the scenario where different keys (i.e. k1, k2,
k3 and k4) are utilized to enroll different users. We achieve an EER of 0 for
DB1, DB2 and DB4 datasets and an EER of 0.09 for the dataset DB3 of
FVC2002. For FVC2004 database, we obtain an EER of 3.08, 2.25, 1.82 and
1.13 for DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4 datasets, respectively which is reasonable
considering relative poor quality images. Hence, it is clear that our approach
also outperforms in the different key scenario.
3.2.3 Time complexity:
To investigate the time complexity of our method, we calculate the template
generation time and matching time on a machine with specification as, Intel
CPU i5, 2400 (3.10 GHz) and 4 GB RAM. The time readings are reported in
Table 2. Note that MATLAB 2016b is used without any code optimization. It
has been observed from the tabulated results that protected template genera-
tion takes almost equal time with the matching time since the matcher has to
retrieve the desired mapped positions in different templates for comparison.
Overall, the average time elapsed in template generation and matching meets
the expectations for an efficient real-time realization.
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Table 2 Average processed time for proposed method under protected template generation
and matching
Proposed
method
Average time (in sec.)
(FVC2002)
Average time (in sec.)
(FVC2004)
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
Template
generation
.0005 0.0007 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0005 0.0006
Matching 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003
3.3 Comparison with existing approaches
The approaches proposed in [4,8,6,7,11,18,19,9,10,16,15] utilized FVC2002
database to measure the performance for their method. Furthermore, few
methods in current literature such as [5,9,10,16,15] also evaluated their
method onto FVC2004 databases. Hence, we have performed the experiments
onto FVC2002 and FVC2004 databases and compared the performance of our
method with the methods described in [4,8,6,7,11,18,19,9,10,16,15,5] to test
the efficacy of the proposed method. In Table 3, the proposed method has been
compared with the existing in terms of EER. In case of the FVC2002 database,
we observe that our method outperforms in comparison to the approaches pro-
posed in [8,4,6,7,19,9,10,16,15]. Although the performance of our method is
slightly lower in case of DB1 for Wang et al. [11], DB2 for Ferrara et al. [18]
and DB4 for Abe et al. [16] even comparable with existing approaches. For
FVC2004 databases, we find that EER obtained by our method is superior to
the existing literature as described in Table 3. Hence, it is obvious from Table
3 that our approach outperforms over the current state-of-the-art.
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3.4 Baseline comparison
We perform two sets of experiments for baseline comparison. In the first exper-
iment, we evaluate the EER using the original (untransformed) template in-
volving ridge features. In the second experiment, we evaluate the performance
after applying the proposed transformation using the keys (k1, k2, k3 and k4).
In case of FVC2002, the performance is degraded by 0.19%, 0.41%, 0.05%, and
0.39% for DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4 dataset of FVC2002 database, respec-
tively. For FVC2004 database, the performance is degraded by 0.03%, 0.03%,
0.05% and 0.06% for DB1, DB2, DB3, and DB4 datasets, respectively with
respect to original (untransformed) fingerprint template. From the reported
results in Table 4, it is clear that the proposed cancelable transformation ex-
hibits very low performance degradation.
Table 4 Baseline comparison for FVC2002 database
Database
EER (in %) Performance
degradation (in %)Without cancelable
transformation
With cancelable
transformation
FVC2002DB1 1.47 1.82 0.19
FVC2002DB2 0.89 1.39 0.41
FVC2002DB3 3.81 4.02 0.05
FVC2002DB4 3.49 5.77 0.39
FVC2004DB1 8.43 8.70 0.03
FVC2004DB2 7.69 7.95 0.03
FVC2004DB3 4.94 5.23 0.05
FVC2004DB4 4.58 4.87 0.06
4 Security analysis
A template protection mechanism should fulfill the requirements of irreversibil-
ity, revocability, and diversity as depicted in Section 1. In the following sub-
sections, we analyze our method concerning these criteria.
4.1 Irreversibility analysis
The requirement of irreversibility or non-invertibility states that it should
be infeasible to obtain the original template from the protected template. To
validate the claim of non-invertibility, we imagine that an adversary unveils the
stored protected template CanTemp. In this situation, the adversary cannot
be able to access the original template (F ) as he does not have any clue about
the four different keys used for mapping. For instance, if an input fingerprint
containing 50 minutiae points is divided into eight sectors, then the original
template (F ) and protected template CanTemp would contain 800 cells and
640000 cells, respectively. Hence, It is not feasible to calculate initial positions
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(k1, k2) and next positions (k3, k4) to extract the entries corresponding to
original template as an adversary would require 640000× 640000 =409 billion
attempts.
Further, assume that the attacker reveals the keys (k1, k2, k3 and k4)
utilized for mapping. In this situation, it would be extremely hard for an
attacker to construct original template since all four keys k1, k2, k3 and k4
comprise of random coprime entries. From the random coprime entries, it is
almost impossible to reveal any information about the original template.
4.2 Revocability analysis
The criteria of revocability refer to issue a new template in case stored template
gets compromised. To validate the claim of revocability, we have generated 100
different protected templates by altering the parameters for the same finger-
print. Next, genuine, imposter and Pseudo-imposter distribution are computed
for the two different datasets of each database i.e. DB2 dataset of FVC2002
and the DB1 dataset of FVC2004. In this experiment, we obtain 0% aver-
age FAR. Also, the mean and standard deviation (µ;σ) of genuine, imposter
and pseudo-imposter are (0.576;0.02), (0.202;0.031), and (0.209;0.0373), re-
spectively for DB2 of FVC2002. In a similar manner, we achieve (0.528;0.017),
(0.196;0.029), (0.189;0.031) for genuine, imposter and pseudo-imposter distri-
butions for DB1 dataset of FVC2004, respectively. From the evaluated dis-
tribution, it has been observed that there is a strong overlap between the
pseudo-impostor and impostor distributions as shown in Fig. 6. This means
that the derived templates from the same subject with different keys are dif-
ferent enough with each other. Hence, it is confirmed that the compromised
template differs from the transformed template yet belong to the same finger-
print.
4.3 Unlinkability analysis
This characteristic implies that there must be significant distinctiveness be-
tween the two protected templates derived from same or different subjects. To
validate this requirement, we evaluate pseudo-genuine scores. Pseudo-genuine
score is evaluated by comparing two different templates of same subject using
different values of k1, k2, k3 and k4.
In this context, if the pseudo-genuine and pseudo-imposter distribution get
overlapped, it implies that the protected templates derived from the same sub-
ject are adequately dissimilar and vice versa. The computational hardness in
differentiating the protected templates aids to the unlinkability characteristics.
Figure 7 shows the pseudo-genuine and pseudo-imposter distribution for the
DB2 dataset of FVC2002 and the DB1 dataset of FVC2004 where the pseudo-
imposter and pseudo-genuine distribution are substantially overlapped. This
confirms the unlinkability for derived protected templates.
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Fig. 6 Genuine, imposter and pseudo-imposter distribution for FVC2002 DB2 (Left) and
FVC2004 DB1 (Right)
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4.4 Diversity analysis
The template generation scheme should be able to derive multiple templates
different enough with each other so that it does not cross-match over different
applications. Many different templates can be derived by changing the values
of key (k1, k2, k3, k4) and seed (ρ). Further, the number of sectors (s) can also
be varied to generate multiple templates.
18 Rudresh Dwivedi, Somnath Dey
4.5 Other attacks
We also analyze our method against different types of attacks namely brute-
force, pre-image and annealing attacks to validate the robustness of the pro-
posed work:
Brute-Force Attack: Brute-force attack determines the total number of at-
tempts made by an imposter to retrieve the original template. This attack is
also known as masquerade attack [25] in literature. In our method, we have
achieved the best accuracy at s=8. For best performance configuration, an ad-
versary would require 409 billion brute-force attempts to guess the positions
of the original ridge features corresponding to an input fingerprint containing
50 minutiae points as described in Section 4.1.
Pre-image attack: In pre-image attack, the adversary may use multiple in-
stances of the protected template to derive a pre-image of the original tem-
plate. Privacy invasion is attempted by utilizing feature order in the different
protected template to create a fake template. In literature, Biohashing based
methods [12,13,14] are vulnerable to this attack since they derive a binary
string which can be easily exploited to unveil original minutiae information.
On the contrary, our method is robust enough to sustain this attack since the
coprime mapping is utilized to hide the original ridge features across many
possible different non-overlapped coprime positions. Also, our method does
not depend on the order of feature components while generating the original
as well as the protected template. Further, any value could not be investigated
from the two projected feature vectors in any position due to the different sized
enrolled and query template. Hence, pre-image attack could not be utilized to
derive the original template in our method.
Annealing attack: In this attack [2], the protected template is divided into
multiple regions, and some regions of a sample template are paired with some
regions of the reference template to evaluate similarity score. If the similarity
score exceeds the threshold, the vicinity corresponding to sample’s region is
included in the gummy template. This step is repeated until it outputs a
gummy template including all the matched vicinities. Our approach is robust
against this type of attack due to the following reasons:
1. Our approach evaluates the nearest-neighbor minutia for each minutiae
point causing the different radii to the different minutiae points. Hence, it
is very hard to map the gummy template with the original template which
is derived from the multiple regions with the variable radius.
2. Ridge-based features are utilized for the neighboring minutiae points in
each sector instead of relative distances or the directional difference be-
tween minutiae pairs. Here, the measured ridge features are invariant to
the inter-ridge distances and locations of minutiae points.
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5 Conclusion
Pre-alignment and the privacy-invasion are two prime factor in fingerprint-
based authentication. To address these issues, we have proposed a novel can-
celable fingerprint template generation method which maps original ridge fea-
tures to a coprime position in a non-overlapping manner. The approach does
not depend on detection of singularities (core/delta). Due to the simplicity
in implementation, the method is suitable for real-world applications such
as mobiles and smart- cards. The experimental evaluations performed over
two publicly available databases FVC2002, and FVC2004 databases show a
significant performance improvement in comparison to the several existing
works in fingerprint template protection. Further, the necessary criteria of
non-invertibility, diversity, and revocability are either theoretically proved or
verified by experiments. The proposed method is tested against different at-
tacks and observed that the transformation ensures the optimal security and
preserves the recognition accuracy. In the future, we would try to invent a
method for the evaluation of ridge feature for low or poor quality fingerprint
and partial fingerprint images.
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